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Issues in the Measurement and Determinants of Business Saving
Abstract
This paper begins with a discussion of the measurement of business saving,
with the conclusion that even "correctedt' measures of business saving are quite
inaccurate in the presence of inflation, leading to an overstatement of the
recent decline in business saving. The remainder of the paper focuses on the
more fundamental issue of why it should matter who saves. Beginning from the
irrelevance proposition associated with the Modigliani—Miller theorem, we
consider the channels through which taxation causes the identity of the saver
to have real effects. Finally, we consider the relative efficiency of busi-







In 1981, personal saving in the U.S. was 106.6 billion dollars, or 4.4
percent of personal income.1 Net corporate saving, as defined by undistri—
buted profits net of estimated economic depreciation, was 49.5 billion dol-
lars, or 44.0 percent of after—tax corporate profits.2 Thus, net private sav-
ing was just 6.0 percent of net national product, which was 2.6 trillion dol-
lars. This level of savings is low by historical standards even in the U.S.,
where savings as a fraction of income has always been low compared to most
other industrialized countries. floreover, it also appears to represent a
shift in the composition of private savings, from the business to the personal
sector. These trends are shown in Table 1. Total private saving was between
8 and 10 percent of NNP for most of the 1960s, and business savings represents
almost half this total. Total private saving shrunk in the 1970s, especially
in the last few years, but business saving has fallen even more. This low
rate of saving in the U.S., particularly by corporations, provided much of the
impetus for the inclusion of several of the "supply side" components in the
Economic Recovery Tax Act, notably the acceleration of depreciation
allowances, the reduction in the top marginal tax rate on personal "unearned"
income, expanded Individual Retirement Accounts, All—Savers' certificates and
the reduction in estate taxes. That these provisions, each of which is tar-
geted at individuals with well above the median family income, were generally
supported by members of both parties indicates how strongly Congress feels
about increased capital formation as a poiicy goal.
This paper has several objectives. \e begin with a discussion of busi-
ness saving, what it is and what influences it. A key point to be made hcre
concerns the proper definition of such saving. Next, we asi; the moreTable 1
Saving In The U.S., 1962—1981
(percent of NNP)
(1) (2) (3)
Private Saving Undistributed Corporate Profits()/ (1)
1962 8.0 3.5 .44
1963 7.7 3.7 .48
1964 9.2 4.1 .45
1965 10.0 4.7 .47
1966 9.8 4.6 .47
1967 10.0 4.0 .40
1968 8.7 3.5 .40
1969 7.4 2.7 .36
1970 7.8 1.6 .21
1971 8.5 2.3 .27
1972 7.7 2.8 .36
1973 9.2 2.7 .29
1974 7.6 1.0 .13
1975 8.9 2.1 .24
1976 7.7 2.4 .31
1977 7.3 3.0 .41
1972 6.9 3.0
1979 6.7 2.7 .40
1980 6.2 1.9 .30
1981 6.0 1.9 .32
Source: Econom±c ieport of the President 12, lahies U—1, U—— —
fundamentalquestion whether it matters what business saving is, as distinct
from a broader savings measure. Since corporations are, ultimately, owned by
individuals, there would appear to be little importance to the identity of the
saver. however, analysts have traditionally looked at business saving as at
least partially independent from household behavior. \hile such an approach
may rest on assumptions about the separation of ownership and control of cor-
porations, or the inability of stockholders to "pierce the corporate veil," it
may also be explained by the structure of the income tax.
The U.S. corporation income tax, small though it may now be as a revenue
source, is still a "classical" corporate income tax in that corporations nnd
their stockholders are taxed independently. This lack of full integration of
the personal and corporate taxes introduces differences in the incentives to
save faced by businesses and individuals. Thus, the saver's identity regains
importance, even if no other cause for distinction exists. \e review recent
theoretical and empirical evidence on this question to help in analyzing the
likely impact of savings and investment incentives at the personal and busi-
ness levels.
Given that the level at which an investment incentive is administered
matters, there is a further distinction to be drawn among different strategies
of delivering the incentive. In particular, there are two general types of
business investment incentive. One (such as an acceleration of depreciation
allowances) applies only (in principle) to new investment. The other (such as
a corporate rate cut) applies to all corporate incore, regardless of sorcc.
This distinction can be extremely important in determining both how effective
the incentives are in spurring more investment and who gains and loses from
the change in policy. After revie\cing the theoretical differences betecn the— —
twotypes of incentives, we present results from a dynamic,perfect—foresight
simulation model to illustrate them. Finally, we discuss the implicationsof
our results concerning both the current and recent changesin the corporation
income tax and the various alternatives that might beconsidered.—5—
II.Determinants of Corporate Saving
\?hy is U.S. corporate saving so low? In Table 2, we present (in columns
(1) and (2)) two measures of deflated after—tax profits of nonfinancialcor-
porations for the period 1962—1981, and (in column (5)) the corresponding lev-
els of dividends. The ratio of dividends to each profitmeasure is presented
in Table 3. The first after—tax profit measure isaccounting profits. This
measure has grown over the last two decades at an annual rate of 3.4percent,
though the growth has not been continuous. floreover, dividends as a fraction
of such profits have declined in the 1970s, indicating agreater percentage of
business saving out of the growing profits. There can certainly heno expla-
nation of a decline in business saving iron such statistics.
however, the savings figures quoted in Section I referred to the second
profits measure, whicr. corrects profits for the miscalculation of depreciation
and inventory profits. The capital consumption adjustmentaccounts for the
fact that accounting depreciation is more accelerated than economicderecia—
tion, on the one hand, but not indexed tc price level changes, on the other.
Together, these factors may lead to either an overstatement or understatement
of profits. The inventory valuationadjustmentaccoants for the fact that
firms using the first—in, first—out accounting method record fictitious inver:—
tory rrofitswhenthere is inflation. Together, the IVA arid CCh may either
increase or decrease the profit measure, depending on the inflationrate.
\hen inflation is. low, as in the early 1960s, the firstpart of the capital
consumptionadjustment, for the acceleration of accounting depreciation over
cccno::ic depreciatiom, dominates the correction, increasing the profitsmeas-
ure. Vihen inflation is hich, the correction leads to a reduction in measured
.rofits.This is quite evidentthrouhout the 1970s up to the J:escntTable 2




Sources: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Data7 asobtained fror the Data
Resources odel Data Bank. Deflation by GNPdeflator. Inflation
gain on net debt equals debt lessfinancial assets, deflated, mul—

























































Profits After Tax Profits After Tax Profits After Tax
w/ CCA aIVA WICCA,IVA and
___________________ _________________NetInflation Gain
1962 .48 .46 .41
1963 .48 .44 .41
1964 .44 .41 .38
1965 .41 .39 .35
1966 .41 .40 .34
1967 .45 .43 .37
1968 .48 .48 .37
1969 .52 .55 .39
1970 .61 .71 .45
1971 .52 .57 .38
1972 .47 .68 .44
1973 .38 .55 .31
1974 .34 .99 .30
1975 .39 .52 .30
1976 .36 .55 .37
1977 .33 .46 .29
1978 .34 .50 .28
1979 .33 .61 .30
1980 .36 .73 .28
1981 .43 .64 .31
Sources: See Table 2—8—
Corrected corporate profits have been essentially flat in real terms dur—
ingthe last twenty years. floreover, dividends, as a fraction of such pro-
fits, have grown to the point where corporations have, over the past three
years, distributed two—thirds of their corrected earnings. Together, these
trends explain the low level of retained earnings. However, though retained
earnings is the measure of net business saving commonly used, it does not
include a component of business saving that has become very important in
recent years: the inflation gain on nominal indebtedness.
At the end of the first half of 1982, U.S. nonfinancial corporations had
1.32 trillion dollars of outstanding debt, and 203 billion dollars in finan-
cial assets.3 Since nonfinancial corporations are net debtors, they realize a
gain when inflation erodes the real value of nominally denominated assets.
This component of real profits, which is not taxed, is shown in coluin (3) in
Table 2. From a very small figure relative to the standard profits measure,
this gain has grown to the extent that it exceeded corrected after—tax profits
during each of the last three years. Including this extra gain with profits
yields a series that has grown even more rapidly than unadjusted profits since
1962, and of which dividends have been a declining fraction.
Evidence that this expanded profits measure may actually be relevant to
corporate saving and dividend decisions cones from the regression results
presented in Table 4. Here, we estimate a simple, partial adjustment model to
explain dividends of nonfinancial corporations, following the basic specifica-
tion of Lintner (1956), Brlttain (1966) and others. The two measures of
after—tax profits, plus the inflation gain on nominal indebtedness, are all
included as explanatory variables of target dividends in the model—9—
Table 4
iodels of Nonfinancial Corporate Dividend flehavior
(Quarterly, 1953:11 to 1982:1)
Dependent Variable: Dividends (D)
Model
Independent Variable: (4.1) (4.2)
Intercept 1.83 1.56
(3.24) (3.00)
Dividends (lagged) .o .80
(16.56) (16.75)
Profits(Adjusted, After Tax) .06 .05
(3.79) (3.98)
Profits (Not Adjusted, After Tax) —.02 ——
(—1.21)








The unadjusted profits figure is insignificant, and the coefficient of the
inflation gain is significant and approximately two—thirds the size of the
coefficient on adjusted profits. This suggests that corporate savings may
appear lower only because corporations distribute dividends outof a broader
measure of earnings than the one commonly examined by investigators.
It is important to remember that this addition to corporate savings does
not raise the overall private savings measure, since measured household saving
does not account for the loss on net financial assets households suffer due to
inflation. oreover, there are many other ways in which corporate profits
could be corrected. One would also like to account for capital gains and
losses on long term debt caused by interest rate changes, for example. how—
ever, perhaps the most important omission is the loss on the assetvalue of
future depreciation allowances. Just as financial assets lose value with inf-
lation,so do the "depreciation assets" which equal the stream of deprecition
allowances attached to a company's assets (Auerbach 1979a). The exact valuc
these assets held by nonfinancial corporations is difficult to calculate
exactly, but a rough estimate is easily obtained. Assuning an averageof N
dollars per year in gross investment, depreciated at double—declining balance
based on a tax lifetime equal to T, a nominal discount rate of r, an inflation
rate of n and a corporate tax rate t,weobtain the following expression for




For realistic pre—1981 values, (t.46, r.06, N125 billion, r.12 andT=l5)
for example, this figure is 9.4 billion dollars, which is nearly of sa &rder— 11—
ofmagnitude as the inflation induced gains on nominal indebtedness in coluxnn
(3) of Table 2. Thus, the puzzle of corporate saving may not be completely
solved after all. However, it seems clear that the apparently drastic decline
in the corporate retention rate is an artifact of the mismeasurement of cor-
porate profits.— 12—
III.ji Should It I a t t e r \ho Saves?
The ModiglianiMiller Theorem challenged a numberof cherished views
about the ability of corporations to influence theirmarket valuation through
changes in financial policy. Modigliani andMiller (1958) showed that it was
of no real consequence whether corporations financedwith debt or equity. and
Miller and Modigliani (1961) demonstrated a similar propositionconcerning the
indifference between retentions and new share issuance.Both of these
results, of course, hinge critically on the absenceof taxes and r.arket imper-
fections. \hat they imply is that business saving,defined as retained earn-
ings, is a concept of meaningless distinctionthat has no real relevance for
analysis of economic activity. If a firm chooses to payan extra dollar in
dividends, it can replace this reduction in retentionswith a dollar of dcb
or new share issues. In either case, thehousehold investor who receives the
dividend can purchase the new security, with the end resultthat there i1l be
no real change in the position of thestockholder or the firm. However,busi-
ness saving will have been reduced by a dollar,and personal saving increased
by the same amount. Therefore, thebreakdown of private saving between per-
sonal and business sectors depends on the conventionof dividenddistribution,
but is of no importance. One could increase businesssaving by inducing reduc-
tions in dividends, but this would only induce compensatingresponses in other
financial variables.
This irrelevance result is not consistent withthe view that firms can
influence the welfare of their stockholders throughstrictly financial trari—
sactions. It also suggests that there is no reasonfor concern about business
saving, rather than privatesavings.5 Yet the traditional view has been tlat
thereare separate incentives governing thebehavior of households and13
corporations, just as the tax system (in the U.S.) treats the sectors
separately. The justification for such separate treatment must lie in some
form of market imperfection, either in the rationality of agents, institu-
tional constraints (such as differential access to capital markets by house-
holds and firms) or taxes.
There has long been some question whether stockholders can "pierce the
corporate veil" and undo any changes in saving by the corporation that are
inconsistent with their own lifetime savings plans. One cannot appeal here to
liquidity constraints, for if a liquidity—constrained stockholder wishes not
to save, he may respond to a firm's additional retentions by selling some of
his shares in the firm. There must be a more fundamental irrationality
present for there to be real effects, if markets are otherwise perfect. One
method used in the past to assess this possibility was to include retained
earnings in a consumption or savings equation. The notion was that corporate
source income, whether in the form of dividends or retentions, should have the
same effect on individual consumption behavior as other disposable income.
For example, Feldstein (1.973) found that retentions had a coefficient about
two—thirds the size of that on current disposable income in a regression of
consumption on these variables plus lagged disposable income and the current
unemployment rate. Column (5.1) in table 5 presents a reestimate of this
equation for the currently available sample period. (Because of a low
Durbin—\atson statistic we correct for first—order serial correlation.) As is
evident from the new regression results, the corporate retentions variable is
now entirely insignificant, indicating an instability in Feldste in's estimated
relationship. The retentions variable is significant in a familiar alterna-
tive specification, presented in column (5.2), which includes a laed con—— —
Table5
The Life Cycle Hypothesis and Corporate Saving





















Source:National Income Acconnt Definitions of Consumption,Disposabic 1ncore
andCorporate Retentions (Earnings lessDjvjdcnds), all in1972 dol-
lars.Household net worth as constructed from Flow of FundsData by
DataResources.— 15—
sumptionrather than lagged income in the regression. However, it is unclear
why the coefficients of retentions and disposable income should be the same,
even if consumers are completely rational. As discussed by Hall (1978), con-
sumption should depend on current variables such as disposable income, reten-
tions and unemployment only to the extent that they were previously unpredict-
able. Thus, the coefficients of these variables in regression (5—2) represent
the effects of their innovations on current consumption. There is no reason
to believe that the coefficients of disposable income and retentions would be
the same, even if consumers don't care whether they save or the corporations
in which they hold stock save. This is because the innovations in retentions
reflect not only changes in corporate savings policy, holding future prospects
fixed, but also changes in future profitability. If corporations increase
retentions substantially, this may cause an increase in consumption because
business prospects have improved. Similarly, unexpected changes in disposable
income, and it is labor income with which we should be concerned (Flavin
1981), will influence current consumption according to how permanent such
changes are expected to be. Thus, unless we make strong and unwarranted
assumptions about the relationship between the stochastic processes generating
disposable income and retentions, we cannot give any structural interpretation
to the coefficients in equation (5—2).
Thus, it is difficult to test whether national saving can be increased
through greater business saving via consumer irrationality. Perhaps more
importantly, though, this is not the only reason why an increase in business
saving might have real effects. The tax system must be integrated into the
analysis, since it upsets the Modigliani—Miller results.— 16—
IV.Taxes and Business Saving
The United States administers a "clas;' corporate income tax, under
which corporations and their stockholders are taxed independently9 with stock-
holders being taxed only on dividends and capital gains actually realized from
share ownership, rather than on all corporate income. The classical system of
taxation has been abandoned by many European countries, who have switched to
either partially or completely integrated tax systems (imputation systems).
The logic behind taxing corporations as separate entities is unclear. Whatever
its foundation, it has distortionary effects on the financial behavior of
firms, and on their incentive to save and invest.
Just how the entire classical tax system does distort behavior has been
the subject of much debate and research in recent years. The effects of the
corporate tax alone were studied by Modigliani and Miller (1963),who pointed
out that the provision for interest deductibility, with no similar allowance
for dividends, provides an incentive for pure debt finance (and,presumably, no
business savings at all) at the margin. However, the situation is complicated
considerably by the existence of personal taxes. The two salient featuresof
the personal tax system here are the progressivity of its marginal ratesand
its differential treatment of personal income from debt and equity. While
interest payments are taxed fully, only dividends are taxed at ordinaryincome
rates. Through the 60 percent exclusion of long term capital gains,and the
taxation of such gains only upon realization (a tax that is forgivenif the
gain is not realized before death), personal incomefrom corporate equity is
favorably taxed. There are two alternative views of howall of these taxes
influence behavior, and they have very different implications for theeffects
of taxation on the incentives of corporations to save.— 17—
A.The Traditional View
The traditional view dictates that equity income is subject to double—
taxation because earnings are taxed first at the corporate level, and then
through the tax on dividends. This double—taxation may be lessened to the
extent that a firm returns some fraction of its earnings and distributes divi-
dends later, because then these earnings are compounded at the rate of return
gross of personal tax; there is a deferral advantage.
Mathematically, if r and 9 are the corporate and personal tax rate, c is
the accrual—equivalent of the capital gains tax, i is the after—tax rate of
return required by shareholders,r is the rate of return on capital invest-
ments, and p is the dividend payout rate, then the corporation's decision to
invest up to the point where a dollar of investment yields just a dollar in
present value of after—tax equity income may be represented by the equation:
1 =feit((1_6)[pr(1_r)e(11)t1_c;t)dt (3)
0
where v is the change in the investment's values at time t.Since =
er)tv0=e(1_r(1—t)t,,= (l_p)r(l_v)e(1 1—t)tThus, equa-
tion (3) yields as a solution for the required rate of return, r:
1 (4) r—
(1—)[p(1—9)+(1—p)(1—c)]
That is, the effective tax rate on equity is +(1—)(p9+(1—p)c]. Since no
such double taxation applies to debt, it is likely (though not certain) that
debt finance will still be favored, However, various constraints on firm lev-
erage may limit the extent to which the debt advantage can be explored, so
that the double—taxation must be experienced on same corporate source income.— 18—
Itis very much in the spirit of this traditional view of the corporate
tax that many integration proposals of the past decade were put forward. For
example, some "partial integration" or "dividend relief" schemes, such as a
dividend paid or dividend received deduction, effectively would exempt from
corporate taxation those earnings paid out as dividends. This would change
equation (4) to
r =[p(i)+(l-p)(l-)(lc)]
bringing the tax treatment of equity closer to that of debt. Full integra-
tion, or imputation of all corporate earnings to individuals, would result in
a symmetric treatment of the income from equity and debt. All such integra-
tion schemes have been sen as a way of encouraging overall saving, because
they would lower the tax rate on equity income. Their effect on the breakdown
between business and personal saving would be less clear. Presumably, with
the discouragement of dividend distributions lessened, there would be lower
retentions and a smaller share of business saving.
B. The New View
While the foregoing view of equity taxation is appropriate for the case
where firms issue new shares and follow a pattern of fixed dividend payout, it
does not necessarily describe the way firms actually behave. Corporations
(excluding regulated utilities, to which special tax rules apply) rarelyissue
new shares.6 As such, their equity source funds comefrom retentions, with
the key difference being that retentions cause an immediate reduction in the
dividend taxes suffered by stockholders. Equation (3) becomes:— 19 —
(1—0) = feit((1_9)[pr(1_t)e(1_P)(1)t]cv)dt (6)
0
which(see Auerbach 1979b) for a detailed derivation) yields:
r =(1-)(1-c)
The taxation of equity income depends neitheron the dividend tax nor the pay-
out rate. Another, related implication is that the value of "Tobin'sq," or
the increase in equity value per dollar of new installedcapital, is (—),
ratherthan 1. These two results are really part of thesame outcome. When a
firm can finance through retentions, it will doso as long as it can increase
shareholder wealth after tax.Since reinvestment avoids the dividend tax,
substituting for it a lighter capital gains tax on the increase in share
value, the firm needn't increase share valued by the full amount of thereten-
tion, but only (f—°)timesthis amount.7 In equilibrium this margin is arbi—
traged by the firm, so there can be no benefit to the stock holder froma
change in the firm's payout rate.
A corollary of this "capitalization" result is thatequity only suffers
double taxation to the extent of the very low capitalgains tax. Moreover,
since the dividend tax itself appears nowhere in theexpression for the cost
of capital, (7), a cut in the dividend tax would haveno direct impact on the
incentive to retain and invest. In fact, since the after—tax discountrate,
i, is likely to rise with a general cut in personal taxes (because taxation of
alternative forms of investment income would be lower) it would leadto a rise
in the equity cost of capital. The important finding,though, is that the tax
on distribut ions, rather than all income, has no effect at all on the incen-
tive for businesses to invest (Bradford 1981). But because thelong run value
of q is (f±),areduction in the tax on distributions would lead to a20 —
windfallgain to holders of corporate equity. Thus, any proposal that would
provide "dividend relief" would be ill—advised as an incentive for capital
formation. On the other hand, a reduction in the rate of corporate taxation
would encourage equity investment and, presumably, investment overall.
C.Evidence on the Competing Views
The major difference between the "old" and "new" views of how equity is
taxed lies in the assumed margin of finance for new investment. Under the old
view, dividends are fixed and new investment is financed by the issuance of
new shares. Under the new view, changes in dividends provide needed equity
capital.
There are obvious problems with each of these hypotheses. As mentioned
above, firms infrequently resort to the issuance of new shares. On the other
hand, the dividend behavior of firms is very stable (see Brittain 1966). A
realistic compromise between these two extreme views of the world would be the
hypothesis that firms "normally" obtain their equity funds through retentions,
but cannot vary their dividends substantially in the short run. Therefore,
when large amounts of funds are required, they must issue new shares. This
type of model, developed in Auerbach (1982b), is a hybrid of two extreme views
of equity policy, since firms can find themselves either in a "retentions"
regime or a "new shares" regime, with the values of Tobin's q and the cost of
capital in the two regimes corresponding to those formulated above for each of
the two hypotheses. This hypothesis was tested by Auerbach (1982b) with a
twenty—year panel of 274 firms, using a model which relates 2t earnings— 21—
toprevious financial and investment decisions. The empirical results
strongly support the following conclusions:
(1) Firms face a higher cost of capital when they issue new shares than
when they do not; and
(2) Firms held by investors in higher tax brackets face a lower cost of
capital when investing through retentions.
These findings suggest that firms behave as predicted by the "new" view of the
corporate tax, except when they are constrained in their dividend policy and
must issue more expensive new equity to finance their investments. In partic-
ular, the declining cost of equity capital with the increase in shareholder
tax rates is consistent with expression (7), since the after personal tax
required return, i, would presumably be negatively related to the personal tax
rate (and the capital gains tax rate is relatively unimportant).
Perhaps the most important implication of this evidence is that personal
savings incentives, such as the recently liberalized Individual Retirement
Accounts, are likely to discourage business savings through equity—financed
investment because the effective rate of taxation of personal interest income
is reduced more than that of equity income. Moreover, that part of the tax
reduction that applies to dividend income, as opposed to interest income, is
basically a lumpsum transferto the holders of corporate equity. Only with
respect to equity finance through new shares does such a tax incentive have
the desired effect. In recognition of this fact, one recent alternative pro-
posal for corporate and personal tax integration in the U.S. (American Law
Institute 1982) would have allowed a dividends paid deduction against cor-
porate taxes only to the extent that dividends are associated with newly
issued equity: integration for new equity only. Interestingly, almost the— 22—
identicalscheme is currently in place in Sweden8 which, like the U.S., still
has a classical corporation tax. Referred to as the Annell deduction, it
allows corporations to deduct against current profits dividends on newly
issued shares for a period of up to twenty years, with the sum of deductions
not exceeding the amount raised and no more than 10 percent of the amount
deductible in any year. Other countries, such as the United Kingdom, have
gone to a full imputation system.— 23—
V.Transitional Differences Among Savings Incentives
The foregoing analysis suggests that personal savings incentives, such as
a reduction in the rate of dividend taxation, and business incentives, such as
a corporate rate reduction, may differ markedly in their effects on invest-
ment. These differences arise from the distortions caused by the classical
system of taxing corporations separately from their shareholders. A second
way in which business and household savings incentives have differed j
tice is in the transition from old to new tax treatment. Business incentives
typically have been narrower in scope, in terms of focusing on new investment,
than have personal incentives. lVhile this difference in scope is not neces-
sary in theory, there may be political reasons why it has been in practice.
As we shall discuss, most savings incentives have important distributional
effects as well as their intended efficiency effects. Incentives that focus
only on new assets harm members of older generations. Though this is true
regardless of whether households or businesses are the direct recipients of
the tax incentives, the connection is much clearer when it is the former.
In this section, we compare these two types of incentives theoretically,
give examples of their use, and present the results of simulation experiments
that demonstrate how important such transitional differences can be. Since
there is no theoretical importance whether the tax incentive is given to
households or businesses, we analyze the former case.
Consider an individual who lives for two periods, receives labor income
in the first period, and consumes in both periods, saving out of labor income
to consume in the second. This individual's budget constraint is:
=(l+r)(wL—c)
(8)— 24—
wherec. is consumption in period i, L is labor supply, an w and r are the
wage and interest rate. With taxes on capital income and e on wage
income, the net returns to capital and labor are r(lør) and w(l—6), respec-
tively. Thus, the budget constraint may be written:
w(l•••6w)cl+w(1_Ow)(l+r(l_Or))C2
=L
'Wemaythink of P1 =w(1—9)
as the price, in labor units, of first—period
consumption, and p2 =w(l—6)(1+r(l—9))
as the price of second—period con-
sumption. Since p2/p1 =1+r(lr)
,Scapital income tax has the effect of
raising the price of future consumption (Feldstein 1978). This disincentive
could be removed in two structurally equivalent ways. Either capital income
taxes could be removed, or both capital and labor income taxed could be
removed and replaced with a consumption tax 9• These alternative regimes




There is no difference if 9 =9,inwhich case the present of tax revenues
W c
is also the same.
However, consumption and wage taxes differ in the timing of their collec-
tions. This means that a government wishing to spend all its revenues in the
first period must run a deficit under a consumption tax regime, and pay the
deficit back with second period tax revenues. Again, this involves no real
distinction, but government does a greater fraction of national saving under
thewage tax than under the consumption tax.— 25—
Oncewe consider the actual context in which such tax changes occur, how-
ever, real differences between wage taxes and consumption taxes are introduced
by constraints on government behavior. Exact equivalence of the two systems
would generally require the capacity to tax different generations at different
rates, and to use debt policy. If government is constrained to impose uniform
tax rates (or at least a uniform progressive rate schedule) and cannot borrow,
the timing differences in tax collections lead to real differences both in the
transition and in the long run under the alternative tax regimes. This is
most easily seen by comparing the differential impact on retired individuals,
who will pay no taxes under a labor income tax, but will face an increased tax
burden under a consumption tax, As a result they will be far worse off under
a consumption tax, and this added tax revenue will enable the government to
impose a lower lifetime tax burden on future generations. Of equal impor-
tance, the consumption tax will in this context be more efficient than a wage
tax, because these taxes on the elderly are essentially lump sum in nature.
These conclusions may be illustrated by comparing the results of simula—
1_A_1t V_i I1flO U1LpL3MUuf£ULUa'.L,J.LLULLLtU ..iulLer i7O.)OL
tionsfrom a proportional income tax to a proportional consumption tax and to
a proportional wage tax. The simulations are based on a dynamic, one sector
general equilibrium model, which in any year is composed of fifty—five over—
lapping generations of individuals (each of whom may be thought of as adults
who exist from age 21 to age 75) who make lifetime labor supply, retirement,
and consumption decisions subject to perfect foresight. Preferencesare
described by an intertemporally separable. nested CES utility function in con—
sumption and leisure, with preference parameters based on relevant empirical
studies. Production is assumed to obey a Cobb—Douglas function in capital and— 26—
labor.From the initial steady state, in which there is a proportional 30
percent income tax, the simulations trace out the path of the economy under an
immediate switch to the new tax regime. Summary statistics of the long run
and short run effects are given in Table 6. In the long run, under a consump-
tion tax, the tax rate needed to maintain a balanced budget is only 28.29 per-
cent, even though the tax base now excludes saving. This lower tax rate is
associated with a higher level of utility. Expressed in terms of units of
lifetime labor endowment, individuals in the long run are 6.28 percent
wealthier than under the income tax. Under a wage tax, the long—run tax rate
is 41.13 percent, and long run welfare is reduced by 3.46 percent. These
differences in long run outcomes of transitions to structurally identical tax
regimes is reflected in the differential impact on transition generations.
Older individuals fare worse under a consumption tax; those aged 55 at the
time of transition suffer a welfare loss of .65 percent of their full lifetime
resources, and a much larger fraction of resources remaining. Under a wage
tax, this same cohort gains .44 percent of lifetime resources. The fate of
those aged 25 at the time of the transition is reversed, with a gain under the
consumption tax and a loss under a wage tax.
Even when distributional effects are neutralized, the broader coverage of
the consumption tax base to include consumption out of assets already in
existence makes it a more efficient tax. With intergenerational redistribu—
tive effects neutralized by lump sum transfers and taxes that hold all pre-
existing cohorts at the status gg level of utility and raise the utility of
pos—::.ge generations by the same amount, there remains a sustainable 1.73
percent welfare gain under the consumption tax, but at 2.33 percent loss under
the wage tax. This very large difference occurs because although the tax sys—— 27—
Table6
Simulation Results:
Welfare and Savings Effects of




Tax Rate (%) 28.29 41.13
Welfare Change () 6.28 —3.46
Transition Welfare Change (%)
Age =25 1.19 —2.61
Age =55 —0.65 0.44
Efficiency Gain (%) 1.73 —2.33
Source: Auerbach, Kotlikoff and Skinner (1983).28 —
temsare structurally the same, their transitional impacts are not.
In a richer model, further differences arise between consumption and wage
taxes that make the consumption tax more efficient, One that is of particular
relevance here is the treatment of pure economic rents.'° Under a regular
income tax1 such rents would be taxed, but this would not be true under a wage
tax. However1 since the present value of consumption for an individual would,
in this case, equal the present value of wages plus rent, a consumption tax
would hit such rents.
If one turns to the real world, there is less evidence of a "bang" tran-
sition to a consumption or wage tax than a "whimpering" erosion of the per-
sonal capital income tax base. In practice all savings incentives enacted
recently have had the salient characteristic of the wage tax of lowering the
tax on income from existing assets. Some, such as the All—Savers' Certifi-
cates, followed the wage tax approach of a direct reduction in the tax rate on
capital income, Others, such as the extension of access to Individual Retire-
ment Accounts, followed the consumption tax of allowing a deduction
for saving rather than a tax exemption for interest income. However, this
differs from the consumption tax as simulated in that individuals face a tax
in withdrawals from an IRA for consumption purposes only to the extent that
they already have received a deduction for previous contributions made. The
analogy to the simulated transition would be the declaration by the government
that no existing assets may be placed in an IRA.
Put this way, it is hard to imagine the government ever enacting such
legislation. But most of the investment incentives introduced over the past
three decades have had this very characteristic of lowering the tax rate on— 29—
incomefrom new investment while penalizing the holders of existing assets.
This is true of the investment tax credit enacted in 1962 and raised in 1975,
and of the accelerated depreciation provisions of 1954, 1971 and 1981. Only
the corporate tax rate cuts of 1964 and 1978 followed wage tax treatment.
This relationship is most easily seen if we consider the most extreme
case of accelerated depreciation, immediate expensing of new investments. As
is well known since the work of Brown (1948), expensing is neutral under an
income tax, because the tax contributes the same fraction to an asset's cost
that it withdraws from its quasirents. It is simply a tax on pure rent. The
government may be thought of as a partner in the enterprise, but there is no
effective tax rate on capital income. But this is precisely how saving is
treated under a consumption tax: a deduction of accumulation followed by a
tax on withdrawals.1' Similarly, consumption out of existing assets is taxed,
although in a more indirect fashion. If old assets do not qualify for expens-
ing, they are worth less than they otherwise would have been, by the value of
the tax deduction that new assets receive. If we assume a constant production
cost for new capital, then holders of old assets realize a capital loss equal
to the tax rate times the asset replacement value when they sell the assets in
order to consume ——preciselyas they would if they received the full price
for the asset and then had to pay a consumption tax. Like expensing, the
introduction of accelerated depreciation or investment tax credits on new
investment lowers the tax rate on new investment and induces a capital loss on
existing assets. This could be avoided if, as with the Individual Retirement
Accounts, all capital, whether new or existing, qualified for the new provi-
sions. flowever, in contrast to personal savings incentives, this is typically
proscribed. For example, the provisions of the Economic Recovery Tax Act— 30—
dealingwith the Accelerated cost Recovery System expressly forbid the use of
the new capital recovery schedules for assets purchased before January 1,
1981
12
This characteristic of business investment incentives is simply a dif-
ferent way of expressing more familiar arguments about the superior "bang for
the buck" that capital incentives such as accelerated depreciation and invest-
ment credits have relative to corporate rate reductions. The latter apply to
income from existing capital and pure economic rents, whereas the former do
not. That such an argument should be so readily accepted at the business
level but not at the personal level is somewhat distressing, but not difficult
to understand in light of the common practice in tax legislation debates of
distinguishing between "business" and "people" as if the two were not related
in some fundamental way, However, given that such targeted savings incentives
seem feasible only at the business level, this constitutes a strong efficiency
argument in favor of business incentives.— 31—
VI.ACRS and Beyond
Recently the Accelerated Cost Recovery System has undergone its first
facelift in the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982; it is a safe
bet that more will soon follow. As many analysts have pointed out,'3 the com-
bination of the investment tax credit and fast write—off is more generous than
expensing for equipment in the three and five year recovery classes. Revenue
projections made before the most recent tax act suggested a continued drop in
corporate tax collections as a fraction of government tax collections. The
trend since 1965 is shown in Table 7.
The provisions of ACRS have strained the corporate tax system. The most
obvious manifestation of this is the rise and fall of tax leasing over the
past year. Leasing was introduced because the combination of low effective
tax rates in general and large immediate deductions and credits meant that
many firms, particularly those with high growth rates, would end the year with
negative taxable income. Because the tax system allows only a limited carry
back (three years) and carry forward (fifteen years now, but still without any
accrued interest), such companies would face the prospect, 'without leasing, of
not being able to avail themselves of the benefits accorded firms with taxable
income. Leasing was liberalized to provide a paper transaction whereby such
unused tax losses could be transferred between companies. iYhile there are a
number of problems with the way these transfers have been accomplished under
leasing,'4 there is nothing inherently bad about having such transfers. Cer-
tainly, the reduction in leasing activity that will come from the recent tax
legislation makes little sense from an economic perspective.




(billions of current dollars)
(1) (2) (3)
Corporate Tax Federal Budget
Fiscal Year Revenues Receipts % (2) of (3)
Actual*
1965 25.5 116,8 21.8
1966 30.1 130.9 23.0
1967 34.0 149.6 22.7
1968 28.7 153.7 18.7
1969 36.7 187.8 19.5




1972 32,2 207.3 15.5
1973 36.2 230.8 15.7
1974 38.6 263.2 14.7
1975 40.6 279.1 14.6
1976 41.4 298,1 13.9
1977 54.9 355.6 15.4
1978 60.0 399.6 15.0
1979 65.7 463.3 14.2
1980 64.6 517.1 12.5
1981 61.1 599.3 10.2
Estimated**
1982 50 631 7.9
1983 51 652 7.8
1984 62 701 8.8
1985 63 763 8.3
1986 64 818 7.8
1987 73 882 8.3
*Source:Economic Report of the President, various years.
**Source:Congressional Budget Office (1982). These projections now under-
state expected revenue because of the recently passed Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982. The Senate Finance Coin—
mittee Report on the bill projects (on page 101) that its change
will increase tax receipts by 42.3 billion dollars in 1987 and by
smaller amounts in the intervening years.— 33—
mentionedadvantage of being available only on new business, investment. How-
ever, it has a number of disadvantages, aside from the difficulties faced by
firms with tax losses. First of all, as with other recent tax changes such as
the capital gains tax reduction of 1978, much of the argument in favor of ACRS
was couched in terms of the need to offset inflation's effect on the value of
depreciation allowances. However, though it more than offset this loss in
present value of depreciation allowances, it did not alter the fact that even
the current depreciation schedule still is based on historic cost and hence
subject to fluctuations in value depending on the rate of inflation. Further-
more, through the simple system of three main depreciation classes, ACRS has
given assets with very different economic lifetimes the same tax depreciation
pattern. This has led to a great variation in effective rates of tax across
15 assets as well as across industries according to capital stock composition.
In turn, this differential taxation can be expected to lead to a misallocation
of business capital, causing an entirely unnecessary deadweight loss.
Alternatives to ACRS that suffer neither from this sensitivity to infla-
tion nor the differential asset taxation include indexed economic depreciation
or its present value equivalent (Auerbach and Jorgenson 1980), each of which,
by restoring a true income tax, would result in an effective tax rate of 46
percent on all capital investments. Neutrality at a zero rate of tax would
occur under expensing, and any intermediate rate of tax could be achieved
through a linear combination of expensing and first—year present value
economic depreciation. For an equity—financed asset that decays exponentially
at rate 8, the user cost of capital to which the gross marginal product will
be set equals:'6
cq(p+ô)(1—k--vz)/(1—r) (11)— 34—
whereq is the relative price of capital in terms of output, p is the firm's
real, after—corporate tax discount rate, k is the rate of investment tax
credit, and z is the present value of depreciation allowances. Since the
gross—of—tax internal rate of return on such an asset is (—ô) and real





Since economic depreciation would yield a present value of depreciation
allowances of z =—-g' asystem with no investment tax credit and a single,
first—year depreciation deduction of a(—)+(1—a) would yield an effective tax
rate of ar for each asset, where v (currently .46) is the statutory corporate
rate.
This analysis assumes equity financed investment. Given the coexistence
of debt and equity finance, it is hard to know how to measure effective tax
rates. Presumably, firms each choose some optimal debt—equity ratiO, but this
decision is separable from the investment decision only under restricted cir-
cumstances. If, for example, a firm's "debt capacity" increases more with
investment in safe, easily identified (and, potentially, easily attached) cap-
ital goods, the tax advantage of debt finance may be greater for such goods
and their effective tax rate overstated, at least relative to other assets.
While little concrete evidence for this viewpoint is available, it would, if
correct, imply that the tax disadvantage of structures under ACRS has been
over stated.
Given the low current rate of corporate taxation, and all of the problems
that still remain, some have suggested that the corporate income tax should be— 35 —
repealed.This certainly would remove the distortions of the corporate tax.
However, particularly for assets that currently receive the equivalent of
expensing, this would result in a perverse reversal of the type of
"consumption—tax capitalization" discussed above.
Consider again the simple case in which investments are expensed under
the income tax, and imagine a transition to a situation with no income tax:
in the previous context, a transition from a consumption tax regime to a wage
tax regime. Assets that had received a deduction upon investment would now
escape taxation of their quasirents, along with new assets not permitted
expensing. Since old and new assets no longer would differ in their prospec-
tive depreciation allowances, they would sell for the same price, with a
resulting instantaneous windfall gain for holders of previously discounted old
capital. The net effect would be a lump sum transfer to holders of existing
capital.
Naturally, the current situation is more complicated than one of simple
expensing, but this argument suggests that it is expensing toward which we
should move, rather than abolition. Full equivalence at the margin with a
zero corporate tax would be provided by extending the same treatment to finan-
cial assets: expensing" net nominal purchases, and continuing to include
interest payments in income. For the typical nonfinancial corporation, this
provision would represent an increase in present value tax liabilities. The
result would be a corporate version of the personal consumption tax. That is,
if the firm's annual pre—tax cash flow is:
f=X—I+AB—iB (13)
where x is the gross return to previous investments, I is current gross— 36—
investment,AB is new debt issues, and iB is interest payments, a corporate
tax at rate r with interest deductibility and immediate expensing of invest-
ment less new borrowing would yield and after—tax cash flow of (1—t)f. As
with the individual, the corporation is taxed on its cash flow which, in this
case, represent stockholder dividends. Under the "new" view of the corporate
tax described above, this is equivalent to a nondistortionary tax on distribu-
tions. This method of transition to a zero tax rate at the corporate level,
as part of the move to a consumption tax, was suggested for the U.K. by the
Meade Committee (Institute for Fiscal Studies 1978) •17
While such a system would increase the present value of corporate taxes
collected,'8 it probably would decrease them in the short run because of the
change in the timing of the tax payments. Rough static calculations suggest
it would be three or four years before the new tax system would raise more
revenue than ACRS,
Aremaining problem that must be addressed is that of tax losses. Unless
the corporate tax is eliminated, there will remain a number of companies with
unusable tax credits and deductions. Were there refundability, leasing would
be unnecessary. However, moves to make even the investment tax credit refund-
able have met considerable resistance in Congress, and now leasing is being
scaled back. The current system of loss carryforwards has two effects.
Since losses carried forward do not accrue interest, and can expire unused,
firms possessing them obtain a lower present value of tax deductions than they
would under a full loss—offset. However, because of the fact that such deduc-
tions lose value over time, the firm has an incentive to overinvest in activi-
ties that will generate taxable income against which the losses an be used.
In the extreme case, with some carry— forwards expiring unused, they represent— 37—
freegoods with a zero shadow price. The result may be that firms with
accrued losses are at a competitive advantage relative to taxable firms. In
this light, proposals to allow carry—forwards to be taken with interest are a
mixed blessing. While they will remove the incentive for firms to speed up
the use of carry—forwards, they will also increase the likelihood of some of
the carry—forward expiring unused. One proposal that deals with this problem
(Auerbach 1982a) would give firms a choice of carrying losses forward with
interest or taking a current lump sum payment, the latter sufficiently
discounted so that it would only appeal to firms not expecting to utilize the
carry forwards in the future.— 38—
VI.Conclusions
This paper has focused on structural issues related to business saving,
rather than on empirical evidence concerning what we can expect specific sav-
ings incentives to do to capital formation. This emphasis is necessary,
because it is only institutional aspects of the tax system and the political
process that make business saving an important conceptdistinct from a broader
measure of national saving. In the absence of such "imperfections"in the
competitive process, business saving is simply an accounting concept.
Because of inflation, even the definition of business saving is uncer-
tain, though it appears to have followed the downward trend characterizing
personal saving in the U.S. in recent years. There is someevidence that cor-
porate savings policy accounts for the fact that earnings aremeasured with
error. It is difficult to evaluate the proposition that savings canbe
increased by taking advantage of shareholder ignorance of firm decisions,but
the existence of a classical corporation tax in the U.S. meansthat the
overall incentive to save does depend on whether the savings is done by
businesses, though retentions, or households, through the purchaseof new cor-
porate securities. Another institutional differencebetween business and per-
sonal savings incentives lies in the political difficulty of introducingtar-
geted incentives at the personal level that induce lossesin the value of
existing assets. Such incentives are the rule at the businesslevel, and are
much more efficient in their effects.
The Accelerated Cost Recovery System has not dealt adequatelywith the
distortions imposed by the corporate tax, and it has made more acutethe prob-
lems caused by the tax system's lack of a full loss offset. However,solu—— 39—
tionsto these problems exist that do not require the abolition of the cor-
porate tax.
Finally, one should keep in mind that the best designed business savings
incentives can only aid in producing a climate hospitable to increased busi-
ness investment. Despite the negative tax rates of ACRS, fixed nonresidential
investment has been lower in real over the first half of 1982 than it was dur-
ing 1981. Recent levels of real interest rates and capacity utilization prob-
ably will dominate any tax incentives that one can reasonably envision.— 40—
Footnotes
1. Economic Report of the President 1982, Table B—23.
2. Id Table B—82.
3. Data Resources USMODEL databank.
4. This expression is obtained in the following way:
The present value of depreciation allowances remaining per dollar of
asset basis is (—-g').where& =2/T.The basis, in real terms, of N real
dollars of assets purchased in year t—s, in year t, isN(16_n)S. Thus,
total basis is:
These have a value in tax savings of whichloses value
annually at rate it.
5.Indeed, one could argue further, following Barro (1974), that government
deficits are of no importance if they simply substitute for taxes,since
the form in which resources are taken froni the private sectoris not
important. Like the Modigliani—Miller irrelevance proposition.this
result depends on the absencc. of distortionary taxation and thefull
rationality of private age:.
2. ee Auerbach (1981) for relevant statistics.
7. If a dollar of dividends is foregone, the stockholderloses (1—0) dollars
after—tax. If equity increases in value by q, his after tax gsin is
q(1—c), given the way we have defined c. Thus, they are equalwhen— 41—
1—0
q(j).
8.See King !J,, (1982)for a detailed discussion.
9. The consumption tax here is defined with respect to the inclusive
base; that is, 0 is the fraction of gross expenditures on consumption
collected in taxes.
10. See Helpman and Sadka (1982).
11. Although all quasirents are taxed with expensing, new investment out of
such rents receies a new deduction, so only the net withdrawals are
taxed.
12. While one could qualify for the new treatment by buying a used asset
after the effective date, there would normally not be a pure tax gain
from engaging in such a transaction, due to the existing recapture provi-
sions. See Auerbach (1982a) for further discussion.
13. See, for example, Auerbach (1982a).
14. See Warren and Auerbach (1982) for a detailed analysis.
15.Seethe Economic Report of the President (1982), Chapter 5forrelevant
calculations.
16. This analysis follows Auerbach (1979a).
17. The U.K. currently has an integrated tax system, expensing of equipment
and interest deductibility at the corporate level. See King al (1982)
for further discussion.— 44—
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